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ABSTRACT
Allusions to death delivered by bits and bytes have been in vogue since the Reagan
administration. Yet, as the internet and its connected devices have since proliferated, cyber
violence remains far more fiction than fact. Nevertheless, prominent U.S. officials have all
but assured the eventuality of a devastating attack. In anticipation, political, legal, and
industry experts are now seeking to codify and inculcate international norms to govern acts
of war prosecuted via cyberspace. Two of the most prominent governance models to
emerge are the Tallinn Manual and Microsoft’s Digital Geneva Convention. The driving
thesis of this research argues that within the monolith of the internet, there lie situations
that can be examined through the lens of New Institutional Economics and commons
governance, lending to rigorous and outcomes-based policy analysis. Through the
application of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this paper
individually evaluates the two governance models in question and offers a theory as to the
likely efficacy of each approach. This research ultimately finds that the Tallinn Manual
achieves its narrow and explicit aims of demonstrating how international law applies to
cyberspace while falling short of reaching its full potential as a governance institution. The
Digital Geneva Convention is unlikely to meet its objective of becoming a binding
international agreement, though the associated, newly founded CyberPeace Institute could
breathe life into the initiative.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Writing this has been anything but a straightforward endeavor. Many have borne
witness to my prevarications over the years and been kind enough to entertain a wide
variety of potential angles and topical variations. I would like to express my profound
appreciation to those who tolerated my stochastic thought process. To my advisor, Deborah
Avant, as well as Rachel Epstein, Julia Macdonald, and Lisa Victoravich for their
willingness to join my thesis committee and for their time and thoughtfulness throughout
review and defense. Professors Avant and Epstein have been particularly instrumental in
the development of my thinking about global governance issues and political economy. To
Lewis Griffith for his teaching, incisive feedback, and the many valuable exchanges we
shared via email and at office hours during my time at Korbel. To Ryan Mahon, for thought
provoking conversations about the world around us and for offering editorial insights while
steeped in his own military training. To Colonel David Wallace for his helpful feedback
on one of the earliest drafts of this paper. To Winnona DeSombre for her characteristically
enlightening and detailed critiques. To Wendi Peck and Bill Casey for taking a chance and
giving me a completely different perspective on military leadership. To the Nobles, for
being the best family I never had to ask for. To Bill and Lisa Bauman for their
encouragement. And to Becca, for her love, support, and enduring faith in me and in us.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS .............. 10
TRAGIC ORIGINS OF COMMON POOL RESOURCE THEORY ........................................ 10
A NEW HOPE: ELINOR OSTROM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS .............................. 15
CYBERSPACE AS A COMMONS ...................................................................................... 19
METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 26
DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................. 27
LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................ 33
GOVERNANCE AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN CYBERSPACE ............................ 36
THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE .................................................. 37
THE AEONIAN DAWN OF CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS ............................................... 43
ENTER THE GOVERNORS OF CYBER WAR ................................................................... 47
The Tallinn Manual ................................................................................................. 47
The Digital Geneva Convention .............................................................................. 51
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 57
THE TALLINN MANUAL ................................................................................................ 58
THE DIGITAL GENEVA CONVENTION .......................................................................... 65
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 74
ENDNOTES .................................................................................................................... 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 88

iv

INTRODUCTION
“At no time in the last two centuries has it been easy to predict whether a major weapon
will determine the course of a coming war, let alone be employed.”
-Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War
In the early evening hours of April 22, 1915, just north of the Belgian town of
Ypres, the German Army unleashed a “strange green cloud of death,”1 which wafted low
over the Flemish countryside, choking the life out of everything in its path. The use of
chlorine gas that day defied Germany’s own accession to the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907, the former specifically banning the employment of poison and asphyxiating
gases as means of injuring the enemy.2 Such renegation quickly became the rule rather
than the exception with France, Britain, and eventually most major powers relying on
chemical weapons of some form or another for the remainder of the First World War.
This example invites speculation as to whether or not even the most overt diplomatic
actions can guarantee the cooperation of warring parties to obey limits of violence. Ever
elusive, peace in our time. The world now stands at the precipice of a new era of
technological weaponry —autonomous robots, malware, sophisticated cyberattacks —
the costs of which are yet to be known. The question is whether or not modern diplomats
can square the circle of channeling international outrages such that violence, if necessary,
is directed and limited, avoiding wanton death, especially of noncombatants. At a time of
1

great uncertainty, two prominent models — the Tallinn Manual and the Digital Geneva
Convention — now strive to codify international norms for the conduct of cyber warfare.
This paper offers a view of cyber warfare as a problem of commons governance,
evaluates the likely efficacy of the models in question, and seeks to advance the global
conversation of how best to prevent unnecessary harm in the information age.
To date, the total number of casualties (that is, deaths or injuries) reported as a
direct result of a cyberattack stands at zero.3 The total number of cyberattacks credibly
alleged to have caused physical destruction of any kind stands at two. The first such attack,
referred to as Operation Olympic Games, or Stuxnet, took place in late 2009 at a uranium
enrichment facility in Iran, causing breakage of nearly 1,000 industrial centrifuge
cylinders.4 The second, for which details remain extraordinarily scant, took place in 2014
at a yet unnamed steel mill in Germany, causing “massive physical damage.”5 The paucity
of physical transgression (even evidence for those alleged cases) notwithstanding, cyber
prognosticators warn of an increasingly dire international situation in which nation-state
attacks are certain to progress in severity to the point of becoming a new kind of violent
political instrument: Cyber War. Over the past 10 years, government officials, including
former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, former Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano, and former head of both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Michael
Rogers, have popularized phrases such as “Cyber Pearl Harbor” and “Cyber 9/11.”678 The
analogies and coincident assurances of “when, not if” have wound their way into serious
discussion, while also prompting some not-so-sotto-voce criticism.9 The imagery is clear
enough. At the highest levels of U.S. national security, the belief is that new technology

2

offers new ways for international political opponents to unleash unforeseen and physically
devastating attacks on one another.
The luxury of relative peace has given legal, academic, military, and industry
experts time to consider the consequences of cyber-physical attacks. This thinking has
elicited two prominent constructs (technically, models) aiming in their own ways to deter,
or at least dissuade nations from utilizing the kinds of technology and tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs) capable of delivering death via digital means. Those models are
The Tallinn Manual and the Digital Geneva Convention (DGC). These models approach
the issue of cyber warfare from different vantage points; the former a legal translation of
international law as it pertains to jus ad bellum and jus in bello and the latter a private
sector initiative to inculcate global norms dealing more narrowly with international
humanitarian law (IHL). In that sense, the Tallinn Manual captures all that the DGC seeks
to address and therefore both deal with the appropriate conduct of cyber warfare pursuant
to the protection of noncombatants. With assistance from the field of New Institutional
Economics (NIE), the research presented in this paper examines these governance models,
taking into account their differing approaches and analyzing contextual variables,
ultimately evaluating the likely efficacy of each in their IHL-related endeavors. A hopeful
byproduct of this paper is to influence the ever-populating arena of would-be governors of
cyber warfare in the fundamental economic question of how to efficiently allocate
resources; principally now: attention.
The Tallinn Manual was first published in 2013 as the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare; the product of four years of scholarly
collaboration by an International Group of Experts (IGE) led by international law scholar
3

Michael N. Schmitt. Its second and most recent version, superseding, while including and
expanding upon and beyond the precepts of the first, was published in 2017 as the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. References throughout this paper
to the “Tallinn Manual” indicate the latter version. The Tallinn Manual consists of 154
rules divided into 20 categories ranging from Sovereignty and Jurisdiction to the Law of
Armed Conflict and Occupation. Each rule addresses a specific legal issue at the nexus of
international law and cyber operations, then provides discussion and interpretation,
commenting only on the lex lata and “assiduously” avoiding the lex ferenda.10 A
motivating example of both the structure and breadth of the manual is found in Rule 58 (a),
which states that “Cyber operations on the moon and other celestial bodies may be
conducted only for peaceful purposes,” citing Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.11
While assembled at the behest and published under the auspices of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD
COE), the authors of the Tallinn Manual make clear it is an independent, nonbinding
expression of expert opinion. It is not an official document.12 The primary audience of the
Tallinn Manual is “State legal advisors,” though it does make room for broader
consumption.13
The Digital Geneva Convention has aimed at broad consumption from the start. As
presswork was underway on the second edition of the Tallinn Manual, Microsoft President
Brad Smith introduced the DGC via keynote speech at RSA Conference in San Francisco.
Unlike the Tallinn Manual, a concerted, long-term, international effort and evolutionary
work, the DGC appeared seemingly ex nihilo.14 Citing the “expansion of nation-state
attacks” Smith exhorted private sector technology companies to call on governments to,
4

“come together, affirm international cybersecurity norms that have emerged in recent
years, adopt new and binding rules, and get to work implementing them.”15 He listed six
specific tenets of the proposed Digital Geneva Convention, among them: “No targeting of
tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure,” and, “Assist private sector efforts
to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from events.”16 Later in 2017, Mr. Smith went
to Geneva to present the DGC to the United Nations.
While critical reception for the Tallinn Manual has been generally positive, it has
also generally been limited to legal and security blogs and publications. Though the
Washington Post was quick to ask how its guidelines may apply to nations meddling in
elections. the DGC was met with greater fanfare from prominent publications such as
WIRED magazine, which quickly asserted “Microsoft Is Right: We Need a Digital Geneva
Convention.”17 The same year, the World Economic Forum (WEF) pressed the issue with
a blog entitled “Why we urgently need a Digital Geneva Convention.”18 Some, however,
questioned the necessity and utility of the DGC, including the CCD COE, which called the
move “both legally confusing and politically unrealistic.”19 Since announcing the DGC,
Microsoft has led several tangential initiatives such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the
Digital Peace Now “movement,” and establishment of the Geneva-based CyberPeace
Institute. What Microsoft’s approach to the DGC lacks in the historical foundations found
in the Tallinn Manual, it attempts to make up for with the kind of rapid iteration iconic of
Silicon Valley (or Redmond, as it were).
For all the ways in which the Tallinn Manual and the DGC differ in their approach,
they have one significant commonality: they are both models of governance put forth by
aspiring global governors. Governance scholar Deborah Avant, of the University of
5

Denver, defines global governors as “authorities who exercise power across borders for
purposes of affecting policy.”20 This may not be clear at first due to wide variances between
progenitors (a group of legal and academic experts versus the president of a tech company),
development

processes

(heterogenous

colloquia

versus

homogenous

corporate

decisioning), and explicit aims (mapping the lex lata to modern issues versus calling on
government action). But each in its own way approximates the situation of cyber warfare,
framing it with distinguishable exogenous and endogenous variables, their relationships,
and expected outcomes. Here, the mere act of framing is itself an attempt to influence
behavior in a particular arena, viz. international politics. It is striking to consider the
different conditions under which the International Group of Experts and Microsoft
simultaneously came to publish similar implicit assessments about the increasing
probability of cyber warfare. The two models establish a spectrum of action ranging from
promotion of messaging intended to reify and osmose international norms, to the call for
an independent global governance regime to promulgate and even enforce a set of binding
rules.
Governance itself tends to be a function of leadership and authority. Avant notes,
“…authority [is] the ability to induce deference in others.”21 Therefore, a key component
of any analysis of governance models is aptitude to induce deference. In the edited volume
Who Governs the Globe? Avant introduces multiple types of authority — institutional,
delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based — while instructing that a combination
of these is far more prevalent than any single type. Governance issues are examined in
depth as part of the Analysis section of this paper, but it is useful to be aware of the types
of authority implicitly exhibited by each model. The Tallinn Manual serves as a prime
6

example of expert authority while the Digital Geneva Convention may be seen as a
delegated authority that borrows the principled authority (really, the brand) of the
established Geneva Conventions. By initially framing this issue in the context of
governance problems, it both motivates the desired outcome of establishing international
norms and aligns with existing literature in the field of economics that enables more
discrete measurement and investigation.
As is often the case with security scholarship, an overarching challenge lies in
proving a negative and avoiding successful proclamations of cum hoc ergo propter hoc.
Prediction can be a fool’s errand. As the philosopher Laozi admonished, “Those who have
knowledge, don’t predict. Those who predict, don’t have knowledge.”22 Fortunately, the
dismal science is never afraid to play the fool. The discipline of New Institutional
Economics — that which theorizes about norms and rules governing the nature of property
ownership, transaction costs, and institutions themselves — and specifically the study of
how to effectively govern common pool resources (CPR), offers a robust, rigorous, and
roundly tested evaluative framework well suited for normalizing and analyzing these two
models.
Powering the Analysis section of this paper is one of the most well-known
evaluative tools to emerge from NIE scholarship dealing with CPR management: Elinor
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Ostrom, whose Nobel
Prize-winning academic work focused largely on the organization of governance systems
for common pool resources, recognized that, “one needs a common framework…in order
to address questions of reform and transition. Particular models then help the analyst to
deduce specific predictions about likely outcomes of highly simplified structures.”23
7

Without minimizing the years of work that have gone into them, both the Tallinn Manual
and Digital Geneva Convention are highly simplified structures in their own ways: the
Tallinn Manual a legal reference book and the DGC a confederation of speeches, policy
papers, and organizations. Each model addresses issues of reform and transition. Here,
reform may seek to answer questions of how best to change current legal and diplomatic
constructs such that nations consciously minimize collateral damage caused by cyber
warfare.24 Transition may seek to answer questions of how to bring awareness to the nature
of the changing battlefield so that nations are held accountable for actions that violate
existing international law. The IAD presents a well-defined framework for normalizing and
analyzing how and how well governance systems function. The ability to accurately assess
preventive regimes and promulgate the kinds of institutions and norms that have the highest
likelihood of reducing negative outcomes becomes more important with each passing
moment that the number of cyber war casualties remains zero.
The research untaken herein is interdisciplinary by nature, with debts to the studies
of international relations, international security (esp. warfare and cybersecurity), global
governance, institutional economics, public policy, and international humanitarian law.
However, it also strives to be as accessible as possible. Therefore, key concepts are
explained throughout, with motivating examples similar to those found in this introduction.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The complete set of introductory chapters consist
of the preceding overview, next a review of the economic underpinnings of the research
design, making the case for viewing cyberwarfare as an issue of CPR governance. With
the necessary justification for invoking the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework in place, the Methodology presents definitions of terms and a diagram that will
8

make four-star Clausewitzians swoon. It also delineates specific process steps and
evaluative criteria. The subsequent section on The Evolution of Governance in Cyberspace
explains how global governance works. It tours major milestones in the development of
cyber governance from a matter with origins in U.S. national security to managing
problems of cybercrime and now to the establishment of international norms. This leads to
a section that presents more in-depth background on both the Tallinn Manual and the
Digital Geneva Convention. In the Analysis section, each model is independently fitted to
the IAD framework and evaluated against the criteria defined in the Methodology section.
Finally, the conclusion restates the findings of the analysis and inquires as to the
appropriateness of corporate involvement in global governance as it relates to warfare
before offering a few final thoughts on New Institutional Economics and lessons learned
from the application of the IAD.
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ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Tragic Origins of Common Pool Resource Theory
What is a common pool resource? Why is the concept so prevalent and even at
times controversial among scholars of political science and economics? Principally, the
issue of what makes a CPR comes down to property ownership and rights of use. The
inherent dilemma is well defined by Adam Smith, writing in Wealth of Nations, “It is
[every individual’s] own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in
view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.”25 Smith’s positivism
makes no conjecture as to the ways in which self-interest and societal good may peaceably
abide. For centuries thereafter, and not until the mid-20th, the debate over allocation of
resources largely remained one of private versus public interest. A house, a ship, a business,
these may be understandably privately owned. Unclaimed land, navigable waterways, the
high seas, domains of the public; sometimes undefined altogether. Yet, shared spaces in
which competing parties seek to extract some utility have long existed, most prominently
in the form of grazing land and fisheries.
The descriptive term ‘commons’ became popular in 1968 when ecologist Garrett
Hardin wrote his now infamous Tragedy of the Commons for Science magazine. Hardin’s
Tragedy refers most directly to an economic problem related to the efficient allocation of
scarce resources, especially within shared, public environments. Hardin’s article deals
10

squarely with the most extreme kind of commons problem, viz. the Malthusian trap. The
tragedy as he saw it was the harmful effect of exponential population growth on Earth’s
resources. His paper served to frame the problem of resource management, giving life to
the concept of common pool resources as generally anarchic situations where the extraction
of materials is zero-sum, and participants may not be easily excluded. Though not explicitly
attributable to Hardin, Figure 1 shows the expansion of exchange type variation that occurs
between the qualities of subtractability and excludability across four categories: public
goods, club/toll goods, private goods, and common pool resources. Hardin’s ultimate
assessment, crucial to the research that would follow, was rather dire in that common pool
resources, though momentarily distinct, are destined for either government control,
complete private ownership, or spiraling degradation. Hardin reveals his own extreme
convictions, ultimately adjudging that “Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all”26 before
launching into a proto-Skinnerian salvo on mass coercion while making some reasonable
points about the annoyance of supermarket Muzak. There’s got to be a better way.

11

Figure 1 Note: It is important to recognize that this discrete representation belies the fact
that massively dispersed, complex systems may at any particular time, exhibit qualities of
one, more than one, or even none of the categories described.

As a brief interlude and motivating example for thinking about the categories of
property interaction from the physical world (though it does offer Wi-Fi), consider the aptly
named Boston Common, a 50-acre park, which sits across from the great gold-domed State
House in downtown Boston, Massachusetts. Founded in 1634, it is the oldest public park
in the United States. It is owned by the City of Boston and managed by the Boston Parks
Department. Boston Common is generally recognized as public property. Anyone may
freely enter, making it difficult to exclude any particular member of the public. And one
person’s enjoyment of the park does not necessarily take away from the enjoyment of
anyone else. In the language of commons analysis within the school of New Institutional
Economics, Boston Common would be said to exhibit low excludability and low
subtractability. For some, this would end the investigation. This is clearly public property.
However, the Common is technically closed between the hours of 11:00 PM and 5:00 AM
and violators of those bounds may be cited for trespassing. This increases excludability
and moves the Common from public property towards a club good. Yet, even during
normal hours of operation, not all of Boston Common is equally desirable ground. There
are two tennis courts with a fence around them that operate on a first come, first serve basis.
In theory, excludability is therefore low while subtractability may be high if one is forced
to wait for a court. The dynamism of economic systems and spectrum of commons analysis
is a recurring theme in this paper.
12

Wittingly or otherwise, The Tragedy of the Commons threw down the gauntlet for
others to find a more reasonable solution. It does so most pointedly in its restatement of
Wiesner and York’s assessment that the nuclear arms race posed a dilemma with “no
technical solution.”27 Hardin defines a technical solution as “one that requires a change
only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of
change in human values or ideas of morality.”28 There are many juxtapositions that can
help codify meaning behind Hardin’s words. Hard versus soft sciences. Science versus art.
Objective versus subjective. False dichotomies these may be, but they remain useful
heuristics. Problems that lend themselves to precise control and experimentation by
limitation of variables are those with technical solutions. Problems too unwieldy for the
laboratory due to imperfect information, belief-based assumptions, and high variability
(even given consistent application of processes) may be recognized as those without
technical solutions.
Hardin illustrates the utility of thinking outside the bounds of technical solutions
with an example from the game of tick-tack-toe [sic], offering a situation in which an
opponent has perfect information about the game (i.e. total knowledge of the set and
sequence of all opponent moves). He notes that, for any challenger, winning in such a case
would be impossible. The opponent, having perfect information, would know exactly
where to move every time in order to guarantee a win. The game would be unwinnable
unless the challenger were to step outside the bounds of the game as it were understood
and rewrite the definition of winning altogether. For a modern example, if supercomputers
beat the world’s best human chess players 100% of the time, then humans could simply
exclude computers from competition, preserving the ability for humans to claim
13

dominance. Given recent advancements in artificial intelligence technology, one might see
such a rule as a form of cheating, but preclusion of non-human entities from human
competition is the rule rather than the exception. Deep Blue and AlphaGo are interesting
modern exhibitions, but do not in any way seem to threaten the official standings of Magnus
Carlsen or Tang Weixing.29
So, it is apparent that the class of “no technical solution” problems necessitates a
sort of gamesmanship in the game making itself; certainly, with the playing. What that
means for the management of common pool resources is that it may be as much an art as it
is a science, echoing the Aristotelian sentiment that “art is the study of things with starting
points in the producer and not the thing being produced.”30 Wiesner and York’s challenge
of understanding the atmospheric and biological effects of nuclear tests differed entirely
from the development of an international system that could control the testing itself by
imperfect and irrational humans. They were the first to make the case that technological
solutions to this latter set of problems would spell doom. Nevertheless, it is critical to
recognize that Wiesner and York ended their 1964 article on an optimistic note. They were
hopeful that the partial nuclear test ban treaty would be a first step toward solving the
security dilemma; international agreements offering solutions not otherwise found in the
hard sciences that split the atom. Decades later, historian Richard Rhodes would call the
[partial test ban treaty] and non-proliferation treaty the “most effective treaties in
preventing rampant nuclear proliferation.”31 Recognizing the fear that paralyzed
generations during the Cold War, the idea that treaties and similar governance models can
provide viable solutions (in some cases, perhaps the only ones) to preventing international
conflict is an historical lesson worth heeding.
14

A New Hope: Elinor Ostrom and Institutional Analysis
If Tragedy set out to quell the optimism of Wiesner and York, it served only to
ignite interest in one young scholar in particular: Elinor Ostrom. Having received her PhD
in political science from UCLA three years prior to Hardin’s publication, Ostrom, along
with husband Vincent, was already laying the groundwork for a way of managing the
commons. A review of Ostrom’s early academic interests provides insight into the
evolution of her thinking in terms of organized systems, management of exchange, and
how to approach common pool resources. In 1965, she published A Behavioral Approach
to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations. In 1968, Constitutional Decision-Making: A
Logic for the Organization of Collective Enterprises. And in 1971, A Theory for
Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems. The breadth of Ostrom’s research, from
fisheries to forests to irrigation practices, demonstrates the prevalence of common pool
resource issues as well as the applicability of the methods she devised. This quality of
abstraction is perhaps best demonstrated in her work with law enforcement.
In fact, some of the earliest rudiments of what would become her Pietic
contribution, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, can be found in her
1978 work with Parks, Whitaker, and Percy, Formation of Police and Law Enforcement
Policy.32 Ostrom’s work cast serious doubt on Hardin’s tragic assertions, becoming the
chief proponent for the notion that common pool resources could be sustainably managed
by their own participants. The IAD framework fleshed out in the early 1980s, harmonized
three key areas: common pool resource management, game theory, and collective action.33
In 1985, Ostrom published Formulating the Elements of Institutional Analysis as part of a
15

collection of essays edited by her and Vincent, entitled Studies in Institutional Analysis and
Development.34 Her essay in particular makes the case for concentrated, empirical study of
institutions by presenting the need to do so and supplying the foundational elements thereof
(these elements are defined and described in greater technical detail in the forthcoming
Methodology section of this paper). The need, according to Ostrom, centers on
interdisciplinary coordination.35
In 1990, Ostrom published her seminal work, Governing the Commons. In it, she
presents possible ways of overcoming the tragedy of the commons, primarily by means of
self-organization and self-regulation, noting “some individuals have created institutions,
committed themselves to follow rules, and monitored their own conformance to their
agreements, as well as their conformance to the rules in a CPR situation.”36 She is explicit,
however, that there are no simple, or even elegant solutions to the problem of allocating
resources in a commons situation. Ostrom addresses proponents of privatization as well as
those who believe in a more command economy-style approach, citing each as potential
solutions within a larger set of solutions based on specific problems. In her own words,
“Instead of presuming that the individuals sharing a commons are inevitably caught in a
trap from which they cannot escape. I argue that the capacity of individuals to extricate
themselves from various types of dilemma situations varies from situation to situation.”37
This should not be construed to mean that commons problems cannot be abstracted in some
sense or that they are intractable. Indeed, Ostrom made significant progress in the metaanalysis of CPR research and would come to reconcile challenges of high variability within
the analytical concept of polycentricity. In short, that social systems in particular tend to
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be recursively nested and woven together in ways that do not comport with simplistic linear
or hierarchical views.38
Since Ostrom’s work in the 1970s and 80s, the Institutional Analysis and
Development framework has become one of the central tools in the field of New
Institutional Economics for understanding how institutions governing the commons can
operate sustainably and efficiently. The framework is essentially similar to a mathematical
function, defining the inputs, operations, and outputs of a particular governance regime.
Translations to IAD terminology follow:
•

Inputs
o Biophysical/Material Characteristics
o Attributes of the Community
o Rules

•

Operations
o Evaluative Criteria

•

Outputs
o Patterns of Interaction
o Outcomes
Yet the IAD goes beyond basic input/output, defining not only the function of the

institution in question, but also the situation to which it is specifically tailored. In technical
terms, this is referred to as the Action Arena, which is made up of Actors and Action
Situations. Defining all of these attributes reduces variability, making empirical analysis
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more accessible. Additionally, the IAD incorporates feedback loops making it possible to
turn otherwise static governance systems into teachable institutions.
While various visual representations exist based on interpretations of Ostrom’s
research, this paper will rely on Figure 239 for analysis40:

A brief recap of the situation thus far. For centuries, economists have attempted to
understand the nature of property ownership and interactions among those who have
interest in said property, viz. the extraction of some utility. Until the mid-20th century, this
conversation was generally binary, explaining ownership and access as either public or
private. The introduction of the commons opened the door for a more nuanced view,
recognizing anarchic systems where individuals interact to gain utility but seek no private
ownership, thereby ostensibly leading to greater collective benefits of use. Hardin viewed
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this as necessarily destructive given man’s self-serving nature and called for extreme
measures to control societal behavior.
Ostrom countered this assertion, positing her own view, backed by field work, that
commons can be effectively governed by their own participants. She produced the
Institutional Analysis and Development framework to aid in the evaluation of economic
systems (i.e. systems of exchange). It by application of the IAD that researchers can better
understand and evaluate the mechanics of a particular system and predict outcomes.
The following section introduces modern research and uses reason by analogy to
tie the key common pool resource concepts to problems in cyberspace, viz. cyber warfare.

Cyberspace as a Commons
A crucial point to make at this juncture is that while Ostrom’s work centers on the
effective management of common pool resources, the IAD is by no means limited in its
applicability to a particular kind of analysis. The reason that common pool resources are
interesting likely comes down to the relative novelty of CPRs in economics, their
ambiguous governance logic, the Nobel Prize committee’s recognition of Ostrom’s work,
and, realistically, Hardin’s pithy phrasing. However, the IAD could reasonably be applied
to any private situation, public situation, or club situation. Similarly, as will be shown in
this section, some have taken to vociferously advocating or decrying the analysis of
cyberspace as a function of common pool resource management. A central premise of this
paper is that complex systems lend to a variety of kinds of analysis and mutual exclusion
approaches Ostrom’s admonishments about panacea thinking. Ultimately, the four
categories in Figure 1 are better thought of as lenses than boxes. There is a deliberate
19

choice here to view cyberspace through the lens of CPR governance because situations
specific to cyber warfare do in certain circumstances exhibit those hallmarks of high
subtractability and low excludability. Opposing views are presented here as an exercise of
due diligence, but also to call attention to the problem of monolithic analysis.
In 2012, venture capitalist and former Intel executive Bill Davidow wrote a 730word missive for the Atlantic entitled, The Tragedy of the Internet Commons.41 In it, he
asserts the efficiency of free markets and the surety that commons open to free markets are
necessarily doomed to destruction, attempting to envision what Hardin would think about
the internet. Davidow initially traverses physical and cyberspace, hypothesizing that digital
retailers siphon revenue from the physical “bricks-and-mortar commons.”42 His main
point, however, centers on the issue of privacy, reiterating Hardin’s warning to make a
point about the impossibility of self-regulation and the need for privacy laws in the United
States to rival those in Europe.
Countering Davidow’s arguments, Mark Raymond, writing in 2013 as a fellow at
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, penned Puncturing the Myth of the
Internet as a Commons. In it, he posits that Davidow’s first point has more to do with
normal business practices than destructive forces related to overuse of a commons. The
point about privacy is considered moot because the mere existence of costs (as in time to
filter spam) does not necessitate a commons situation. Raymond’s first point makes sense.
It is strange indeed to compare the cannibalism of physical retail by online shops to be in
any way related to even modern interpretations of the commons. That does not necessarily
exclude it from the realm of possibility, but Davidow positions it as a function of the
internet as a commons. Davidow would find more purchase analyzing the online retail
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function itself as a kind of commons, relying on models such as Porter’s Five Forces to
explain the effect of new entrants on a market. And even on that face, little purchase would
the argument find, unless Davidow could demonstrate that too many entrants to the digital
marketplace cause customer burnout, driving away online sales. Davidow’s privacy
argument is much stronger than Raymond gives credit. For one, the argument is not
primarily concerned with costs incurred as a result of spam. If privacy can be unitized, then
it can be measured as a function of subtractability. That would at least make it more likely
to be a matter of either private property or common pool resources. From there, and well
beyond the scope of this paper, one would have to determine how excludability works to
increase and decrease privacy. If one feels their privacy is decreased by some online
activity, does self-exclusion increase privacy? What are the systemic effects of data-as-aservice (DaaS) companies on the ability for one to manage his or her privacy? These are
questions worth investigating and Davidow is clearly attempting to start the conversation
(or at least he was in 2012). The most egregious error in Davidow’s piece is the complete
disregard of 40 years of research since Hardin’s Tragedy.
Raymond’s Puncturing the Myth quickly moves past Davidow, contending
primarily that while a commons must exhibit rivalry (i.e. zero-sum subtractability) and
excludability, the internet does neither.43 Raymond wisely borrows from thoughts
expressed by both Hardin and Ostrom about pollution, presenting the example of
congestion as one way that the internet could theoretically become rivalrous. However, he
offers that a simple solution may be found in building out infrastructure and generally
improving technology. He goes on to point to several ways in which internet participants
may be excluded from use, including the example of the so-called “Great Firewall of
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China” and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Curiously, some of Raymond’s
arguments suit their own needs as they arise. For instance, if the solution to congestion is
to simply “build more physical infrastructure,”44 yet participants may be easily excluded
from the internet through the destruction of infrastructure (as Raymond asserts45), then
every situation has a solution and the problem loses its bounds. One arguing for thinking
of the internet as a commons would be burning infrastructure to create rivalry while
building it for non-excludability. One arguing against thinking about the internet as a
commons would be building infrastructure for non-rivalry and burning it to keep people
out. The phrase self-licking ice cream cone finally makes sense.
Raymond’s contrarianism might be too quick to make a point where better framing
of the issue would have improved its fidelity. His argument is correct in its focus on the
language of commons analysis, where rivalry is a function of subtractability, positioned
orthogonally to excludability. However, his ultimate assessment that the internet is more
akin to a set of nested clubs is unnecessarily limiting. Certainly, in some aspects, the
internet may exhibit qualities of clubs, and those clubs may well be nested. But as desirable
as an elegant nomenclature may be, it does not accurately capture the polycentric
independence of various exchanges having to do with cyberspace. The internet is a massive
and unique combination of physical infrastructure, digital transmissions, personas, and
abstract concepts. Analyzing it as a monolithic set in any regard is unproductive and leads,
as Raymond’s paper demonstrates, to recursive exceptionalism; hemming and hawing. The
overwhelming majority of commons research does not examine all arable land as a
commons but narrows its focus to a specific plot of land for which subtractability tends to
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be high and excludability low. In fact, it was Hardin who attempted to solve for the entirety
of the biosphere as a commons and it led to an appeal for forced sterilization.
The task, then, is not to answer if cyberspace is a commons, but to posit when and
where cyberspace exhibits elements of a commons, given a particular context. When
framing the internet as a domain of warfare, one focal area fits the definition of a commons
exceedingly well: internet-connected industrial control systems (ICS). These systems are
used around the world to automate processes in large-scale utilities, manufacturing
facilities, oil & gas operations, and infrastructure controls; not to mention localized
deployment in commercial transportation vehicles such as ships and airplanes. In a sense,
the growing adoption of ICS, is creating a commons for nation-states to exploit. This results
in a situation where any nation-state may endeavor to attack any ICS (low excludability)
and the successful exploitation of an ICS results in at least the exploit (in a technical sense),
but potentially the entire system, being made unavailable to other nation-states (high
subtractability), most importantly the host nation. In other words, the proliferation of
internet-connected ICS may be “stocking the pond” for cyber warfare.
Another example of a commons situation specific to cyberspace and cyber warfare
is in the development and use of zero-day vulnerabilities (0-days). The U.S. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines a zero-day attack as one that
“exploits a previously unknown hardware, firmware, or software vulnerability.” Major
attacks like Stuxnet can take advantage of numerous zero-days at once, showing a
propensity for some to stockpile and chain 0-days for complex operations. Of course,
software vulnerabilities tend to be a rule of coding rather than an exception, and developers
are regularly issuing patches so that users are guarded against flaws and exploits. However,
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there are situations when an attacker is able to find a vulnerability and maintain its secrecy
long enough to develop an exploit, deliver a payload, and compromise a system. Here, only
upon discovery of some intrusion can a developer eventually determine that there is a
vulnerability and issue an appropriate fix. The ubiquity of software makes it virtually
impossible to exclude anyone from analyzing code for vulnerabilities, and the limited-use
nature of 0-days gives them the quality of high subtractability. The global availability yet
extremely limited use of 0-days makes them one of the truly novel issues related to cyber
warfare. Imagine 20 ships enter a fishery and all 20 ships catch a single fish. They are all
able to view and touch and smell the fish on their own ships. The following day, 19 ships
come to find that their fish have rotted because the captain of the 20th ship had a nice, big
dinner. Also, the power is now out in Ukraine. Such is the new commons of cyberspace
and cyber warfare.
The point of introducing these examples is not to narrowly define a perspective that
will necessarily carry across each of the governance models under review — though it is
presented because it closely aligns with problems of physical aggression that concern those
discussing cyber warfare. Rather, it is to demonstrate how problems related to the internet
and cyber warfare can and do take on characteristics such that individual situations can
reasonably be considered common pool resources. This lays an important foundation,
providing specific reasoning for selection of the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework. It is difficult to overstate the high degrees of complexity, variability, and
subjectivity in interpreting cyber warfare as a problem of the commons. Yet, hopefully the
explanations of the strategic and economic implications of ICS and 0-days removes any
doubt that it is feasible. Recall Raymond’s allusion to the congestion problem. This is an
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often-overlooked converse perspective on the commons that strengthens the case for cyber
warfare as a common pool resource issue. It was Hardin who said in Tragedy, “…the air
and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons
as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that
make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated.46
In international relations terms, this means that in order to prevent that most pollutinous
practice of warfare, nation-states must find it less costly to resolve political matters
diplomatically than to conduct violent cyberattacks.
There are three key takeaways from the preceding sections. First is that cyber
warfare is worth analyzing and discussing, if not for that most important endeavor of
preserving peace and human life, then because so much remains unknown even as some
are attempting to establish norms and governance regimes for its proper management.
Second is that certain aspects of cyberspace do comport with traditional notions of the
commons and an especially relevant concept is that of subtraction by addition or pollution.
Third is that the field of economics and especially the discipline concerning analysis of
common pool resource management has a framework capable of analyzing the likely
success and sustainability of a governance system.
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METHODOLOGY
The primary objective of this research is to assess the likely effectiveness of two
of the most prominent cyber warfare governance models in existence today: the Tallinn
Manual and the Digital Geneva Convention. While each model will be assessed against
self-stated or implied objectives, the overarching question remains one of how best to
inculcate global norms of cyber warfare in order to maximize the security of
noncombatants by minimizing physical injury to them.
One of the most brilliant aspects of Ostrom’s work in developing the IAD is in
her commitment to ensuring its broad and successful application. In addition to the
establishment of the Ostrom Workshop at the University of Indiana and continuing
rigorous field work throughout her life, she provided an instruction manual for how to set
up a study using the IAD framework. This paper therefore adheres to this guidance,
which is published as An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design by
Margaret M. Polski and Elinor Ostrom.47

The research design follows seven steps:48
1. Define the policy analysis objective and specify the analytic approach
2. Analyze physical and material conditions
3. Analyze community attributes
4. Analyze rules
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5. Integrate the analysis (in process with both Tallinn Manual and DGC)
6. Analyze patterns of interaction
7. Analyze outcomes
Each model will be independently fit to the IAD framework as shown in Figure 2
using explicit elements from proponent discourse and implicit derivations from public
exposition. To the greatest extent possible, questions posed in each step of the research
design will be controlled so that analysis remains model independent. However, this is
not a comparative study and the differing nature of the models may necessitate some
variance in the lines of questioning.
Definitions
First and foremost, a few words on words. Arguably, the most important
definition related to this research is that which forms an understanding of the term cyber
warfare. Whereas definitions for framing the models in question are taken from existing
IAD literature and specific technical definitions are taken from the models themselves,
the notion of a cyberattack in the context of cyber warfare must be dealt with here and
now. Since the DGC offers no explicit commentary on the matter and the Tallinn Manual
devotes nearly six pages to the topic, the following definition applies to references made
by both models:
Cyberattack (also, cyber attack) — As defined by Rule 92 in the Tallinn Manual
2.0, a [cyberattack] is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to
objects.49
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Since there is little in the way of official definitions of cyber warfare, this
research refers to such conduct as that in which one nation-state actively employs one or
more cyberattacks against another nation-state in pursuit of political objectives.

The following definitions serve three purposes. The first is to clearly define each
variable found within the IAD in order to establish the nodes for logically mapping
attributes of each individual model. The second is to provide a greater sense of context
around the variability across each variable. The third is to highlight how each variation of
individual variables will be handled for the purposes of this research. In order to maintain
consistency with existing literature, other than a few exceptions, the definitions below are
generally attributable to the same source, viz. MD McGinnis’s An Introduction to IAD
and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework.50

Framework — Identifies, categorizes, and organizes those factors deemed most
relevant to understanding some phenomenon. 51

Theory — Posits general causal relationships among some subsets of these
variables or categories of factors, designating some types of factors as especially
important and others as less critical for explanatory purposes. 52

Model — Specifies the specific functional relationships among particular
variables or indicators that are hypothesized to operate in some well-defined set of
conditions. 53
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Institutions — The set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible
to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation
rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not
be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.54

The Tallinn Manual and the DGC are best understood as models of institutions.
Those institutions may be customary international law, the Geneva Conventions,
governance scholarship, etc. It would be premature to say that either model is yet accepted
as a set of working rules for the absent conduct of cyber warfare.

Polycentricity — a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping
jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which
these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are
authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes. 55

Exogenous Variables — Designates variables that appear in an
economic/econometric model but are not explained by that model (i.e. they are taken as
given by the model).56

Biophysical/Material Conditions — The biophysical or material conditions
denoted in each model describe the nature of the good or physical/material conditions.
There are two defining characteristics of goods and services: Subtractability (i.e. Does
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A’s consumption of a resource lower B’s potential enjoyment thereof?) and Excludability
(i.e. How costly is it for A to exclude B from the resource?). These characteristics are
typically viewed orthogonally to one another with subset measurements of high and low.
Based on the degree of highness or lowness, entities can be categorized thusly:

•

Low Subtractability and High Excludability: Public Goods

•

Low Subtractability and Low Excludability: Toll or Club Goods

•

High Subtractability and High Excludability: Private Goods

•

High Subtractability and Low Excludability: Common Pool Resources

For each of the models, the Biophysical/Material Conditions are such that the
governance of cyber warfare includes the conduct of cyber warfare, where high
subtractability is evident in three key areas: physical harm to noncombatants, destruction
of physical systems, and global security in general. And excludability is low given the
hyperconnected nature of the internet, amplified by problems associated with attribution
and non-repudiation. The exogenous nature of human life, ICS, and security become
endogenous when analyzed in the context of the Action Arena.

Attributes of Community: This is a summary term used to designate all relevant
aspects of the social and cultural context within which an action situation is located. Key
themes are trust, reciprocity, common understanding, and social capital. 57
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Because neither the “community” nor the “attributes” thereof are explicitly
defined by either model, in order to normalize analysis, this research introduces a novel
and modified interpretation of the Clausewitzian Trinity58, hereafter referred to as Figure
3. This modern take on an easily recognizable model serves to marry the disciplines of
military strategy and economics while providing a quick reference for thinking about
relationships within the relevant communities under review.

Rules - Rules that specify the values of the working components of an action
situation. While McGinnis presents seven distinct kinds of rules, this research does not
specifically address each in kind. Rather, it seeks to identify rules of each institution and
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rules that come as a result of the creation of those institutions. In other words, rules for
development process may be as or more important (in this anticipatory state) than rulesin-use.59

Action Situations – This is the core component of the IAD Framework, in which
individuals (acting on their own or as agents of organizations) observe information, select
actions, engage in patterns of interaction, and realize outcomes from their interaction. 60

The Action Arena - The action situation is the “black box” where operational,
collective, or constitutional choices are made. 61

Participants – Includes the parties acting upon and constrained by the elements
of excludability and subtractability. 62

Interactions and Outcomes - Denotes the pattern of interactions among resource
users and the particular resources upon which their livelihood relies; both the social and
the ecological components of this focal action situation can be decomposed into smaller
components as well as situated within the context of broader aggregations.

Evaluative Criteria - Evaluative Criteria may be used by participants or external
observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes are deemed satisfactory
and which aspects are in need of improvement. 63 Each criterion will include an
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assessment of high (green), medium (yellow), low (orange-red), or NA (white), along
with a brief rationale. The following chart provides an example:
Evaluative Criteria
Efficiency in use of resources,
especially capture of economies
of scale
Equity in distributional
outcomes and processes
Legitimacy as seen by
participants in decision
processes
Accountability, especially to
direct users of resource
Fiscal equivalence: the extent
to which the beneficiaries of a
public good or service are
expected to contribute towards
its production
Consistency with the moral
values prevalent in that
community
Robustness or resiliency

Sample Ratings (Low, Medium, High)
High – Proven viable at multiple levels
High – Maximizes utility of all stakeholders
Medium – National but not international
recognition
Medium – Rules in place but little enforcement
Low – Undue fiscal strain on unrelated parties

Low – Values are at odds with affected
community
NA – Not enough data to evaluate

Limitations
This research is subject at least to the following limitations, biases, and
assumptions:
•

Faulty premise - This research assumes that cyber warfare is a possibility. If
Johns Hopkins Professor Thomas Rid is correct, then Cyber War Will Not Take
Place.64 Dr. Rid is not alone in his assertion, buffeted by Gartzke’s The Myth of
Cyberwar.65 If this is the case, then developing rules to prevent cyber war would
be a waste of time and this analysis would be an even greater waste of time.
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•

Many rivers to the sea - The Institutional Analysis and Development framework
is not a guarantor of success any more than a historically successful business
model or war strategy is a guarantor of success. Instead, it is to be understood as a
guide for delineating the various parts of systems that tend to fall into particular
categories, enabling some degree of rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, there are
bound to be those who misinterpret the evaluation as in some way definitive. The
best that this research can ever do is to gently guide the conversation.

•

The recursive prison of polycentricity – Drawing conclusions about
interconnected social systems necessarily calls for a kind of hypervariate analysis
that could go on without terminus. Where termini exist in this research, they have
been placed either by the analyst or that most joyous constraint of time.

•

No one asked for this - Neither the Tallinn Manual nor the Digital Geneva
Convention makes any reference to development using the IAD framework as a
guide. Therefore, fitting these governance frameworks to the IAD is necessarily
deductive and will require some degree of subjective assessment and good
judgment. That judgment is and ought to be open to interpretation, and the
research welcomes disconfirmation.

•

Post hoc cum/ergo propter hoc – So long as nation-state behavior aligns with
explicit norms, it can be difficult to disprove success of those norms. Dangers of
correlation, causation, etc. This does not necessarily mean that the norms earn the
benefit of the doubt, but it does call for additional theorizing about the causes of
peace when war is an option.
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•

High degree of subjectivity – The IAD requires some degree of artistry in
application. That, combined with the complexity of global governance issues and
the uncertain of what the future will bring, increase the chance of bias affecting
interpretations or findings.
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GOVERNANCE AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN CYBERSPACE
One of the major areas of study within New Institutional Economics is the
interplay between institutions (formal and informal rules) and the individuals,
organizations, and interactions that they govern. A key takeaway from Ostrom’s research
is that commons can be effectively governed while maintaining the attributes that make
them a commons in the first place. She uses the entirety of the third chapter of Governing
the Commons to demonstrate situations of successful and sustainable self-governance.
This is encouraging for local problems as those principles of success may be applicable
on a global scale. This section provides a brief overview of the concept of governance as
understood within the discipline of international relations. Though, the interdisciplinary
leap isn’t as great as it may at first appear. There are important points from IR
scholarship that are useful for thinking about applying Ostrom’s local economic success
stories to interactions between nation-states, including the conduct of war.
Global governance can be defined as “the collective effort to identify, understand,
and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual states.”66
Perhaps one of the best examples of polycentricity as it relates to governance is found in
the introduction to Ann-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order. There, she describes an
ideal in which global governments would be interconnected in a latticework that would
look like the globe atop Lee Lawrie’s Atlas sculpture in Rockefeller Center. She
describes this as a “world of government networks” with the promise of greater
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effectiveness and justice than “a set of global institutions perched above nation-states
enforc[ing] global rules.”67 It can be easy to think of governance purely as a function of
the state; however, states are not alone in the development, proliferation, or even
enforcement of governance mechanisms.68 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs),
think tanks, academic institutions, corporations, and individuals are all potential
participants. Citing Martin Shapiro, Slaughter discusses the presumptive duty of private
actors in upholding the public trust as new members of global policymaking. Shapiro
himself states that moving from government to governance can erode boundaries between
what is in and outside of government.69
Consider the deployment of far-reaching standards such as the fifth generation of
wireless technology. Deployment of 5G networks has necessarily been a joint effort
between corporations responding to consumer demands, governments responding to the
desires of their constituents (along with the promise of increased soft power), and
international alliances that manage the use of 5G networks across borders to comport
with differing legal requirements. The case of Huawei and Euro-American adoption of
5G is instructive as to how even low-level international conflict can influence governance
decisions and project onto private industry the politics of the state.

The Evolution of Governance in Cyberspace
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief review of how governance has
evolved in cyberspace, from notional circumstances supported by concerns over U.S.
national security to an international, polycentric practice covering topics ranging from
physical hardware to intellectual property theft. Interestingly, the current focus on cyber
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warfare brings governance full circle, even as it has expanded in scope. Technological
advancement pairs neatly with matters of global governance. There is perhaps no better
example of this than the internet. What began under the auspices of the United States
Department of Defense through its Advanced Research Projects Agency and relying upon
connections between the University of California, Los Angeles and the non-profit
Scientific Research Institute (SRI) International, now connects tens of billions of devices
in every country on earth.
Initially, governing the internet was a largely technical matter, the responsibility
for which lay with its creators and early adopters in government and academia. True
codification of standards began in 1986 with the forming of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), followed in 1988 by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA), and most prominently in 1998 by the Internet Corporation for the Assignment of
Names and Numbers (ICANN). On the last point, former U.S national security official
Richard Clarke has shared his skepticism that, “ICANN demonstrates [a] vulnerability of
the Internet, which is governance, or the lack thereof. No one is really in charge.”70 Yet
even ICANN boasts four advisory committees, including internet users and governments.
All of these organizations have focused on establishing technical norms to increase
international adoption. They were not, however, built to address rising issues of nefarious
use of the internet. The vast majority of governance in cyberspace has thus far been
legislative.
The earliest attempts to govern the use computer systems predate even webpages.
In the United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) classified for
the first time computer crime as separate and distinct from mail and wire fraud. The
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nuanced nature of and capabilities afforded by interconnected computers required new
and specific kinds of regulation. It is nevertheless important to remember that the CFAA
arose not out of an immediate need to address any particular problem, but in reaction to a
Hollywood film. Fred Kaplan opens his book Dark Territory with the story of how, in
1984, President Reagan was compelled by the movie WarGames to ask about information
systems and associated threats to national security. Understandably, the president was
concerned that a hacker could launch an ICBM with the stroke of a key. Then-Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, reported back to the president that the
“problem is much worse than you think.”71 Soon thereafter, on September 17, 1984, the
Reagan Administration published the National Policy on Telecommunications and
Automated Information Systems Security or National Security Decision Directive
Number 145 (NSDD-145). The document laid the foundation for what would become the
CFAA. Since the time it was signed into law, the CFAA has been amended no fewer than
nine times to extend its reach. New provisions have included extended protection for the
financial sector, elimination of the need for intent in the use of classified information,
new definitions of “damage,” increased penalties for state computer crimes, expanded
protection to “extraterritorial” computer systems, and even broader coverage in the
private sector, among others.72
Over the same time period, other nations have sought to enact similar laws
governing the use of computers and access of systems via the internet. The United
Kingdom passed the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, which, like the CFAA, is regularly
amended. Singapore has its own Computer Misuse Act, first passed in 1993. In 1997,
China enacted the Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and
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Management Regulations. And in 2007, the Council of Europe (CoE) hosted the
Budapest Convention, which produced the first international treaty to bring concordance
to the many individual national laws that had emerged over the interceding decades. The
treaty was successful not only in its acceptance and ratification by European Council
members (inclusive of many nations not otherwise members of the European Union), but
also by prominent non-CoE states such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, and the
United States. These individual and collective efforts have made abstract concepts like
cybercrime more tangible in the minds of political leaders, law enforcement officials, and
individuals alike. However, an unintended consequence has been the implicit and
deepening commingling of cybercrime with broader national defense and acts of war.
Use of the CFAA to prosecute both civilians committing petty crime and
representatives of nation states attempting to breach government networks illustrates a
kind of legal scope creep that opens wide the interpretation for oft-misunderstood actions.
One of the most infamous and controversial cases involving the CFAA was the 2011
prosecution of Aaron Swartz, a software developer and co-founder of the popular news
and culture website Reddit. That year, Swartz was caught downloading academic articles
using the network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Prosecutors
assumed that his intention was to distribute the articles for free via peer-to-peer networks.
Swartz was charged with 11 violations of the CFAA, which carried possible penalties of
up to $1 million and 35 years in federal prison. Two days after being denied a plea
bargain in the case, Swartz hanged himself.73
Many have cited the theft of intellectual property (IP) as a threat to national
security.74 In a 2019 guest post for the Council on Foreign Relations, Erica Borghard of
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West Point and Shawn Lonergan of consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers described
how the United States had recently begun offensive cyber operations designed to steal
Chinese IP in retaliation for Chinese groups allegedly stealing American IP, especially
that which could impact national security.75 Borghard and Lonergan specifically cite
indictments issued in 2018 by the United States government concerning the theft of
information related to proprietary technology from various private firms as well as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL).76 Many of the statutes cited in the indictment relate to Chapter 18,
Section 1030 of U.S. Code, the CFAA. Not only did the indictments against the suspected
Chinese hackers include language like “victim,” “advanced persistent threat,” and
“overcoming network defenses,” the U.S. Department of Justice published a press release
in December 2018 emphasizing the national security implications of the alleged Chinese
hackers.77 At the time, then-director of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
Dermot F. O’Reilly said, “The theft of sensitive defense technology and cyber intrusions
are major national security concerns and top investigative priorities for the DCIS.
In the case of Aaron Swartz, no such parallels were or have since been officially
drawn to the need for preventing his alleged behavior in order to preserve national
security. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that although the CFAA may have
originated out of concerns for national security, it has come to serve a dual purpose (or
more accurately taken on a superseding purpose) in settling more routine criminal and
civil matters. None of this is to say that the concept of national security pertains only to
the prevention of physical attack by foreign adversaries. In fact, there exists a continuum
by which one nation may seek to conduct espionage and escalate to more overt criminal
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acts to test defenses for the sake of staging an attack. However, nations must be
especially watchful when dealing with information technology and security as it tends to
compound abstract concepts. When it comes to speculation about the blurring of these
lines, some scholars point to more perverse motivations. Political scientist and IP scholar
Debora Halbert has written that, “the focus on the theft of intellectual property as a
security issue helps justify enhanced surveillance and control over the Internet and its
future development.”78
This is a critical point and one which speaks directly to aspiring governors of
cyber warfare. There is a great paradox in the juxtaposition between problem
identification and solutioning. That is, that one may develop an idea of some potential
problem and draw logical conclusions to its eventuality. However, the time between
problem identification and the testing of a solution in real-time can be vast. Without
periodic application of the proposed problem-solving mechanisms, there exists a practical
vacuum that governors tend to fill with analogous application. The problem then is that
these interim applications result in their own effects and their immediacy necessitates
change moment to moment, all while the spectre of the original problem is yet to be seen
in action. By responding to these moment-to-moment needs, the tendency to stray from
original aim increases, as the farther a bullet travels from the muzzle of a rifle, the more
chance it will be impacted by physical forces and the surrounding environment to be
knocked off course. The paradox itself is that the interim actions serve to justify
functionally and economically the continuance of wayward travel and barring some
Socratic effort, one with potentially infinite downside, there is no mechanism for keeping
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a movement on its trajectory. The following section illuminates this paradoxical gap by
condensing more than 30 years of cyber warfare into a few vignettes.

The Aeonian Dawn of Cyber-physical Attacks
To date, the number of cyberattacks known to have caused physical damage
remains at one.79 The attack in question was discovered in 2010 by Belarusian malware
analyst Sergey Ulasen.80 At the time, Ulasen had a customer in Iran reporting that
computers running Microsoft Windows were unexpectedly rebooting and producing what
is known as the “blue screen of death,” a situation in which a computer freezes, showing
only a bright blue background on the screen. The code causing the problems came to be
known as Stuxnet and it would forever change how nations and individuals viewed the
cyber-physical divide. In a 2011 interview, Ulasen noted, “the complexity of Stuxnet’s
code...led us to conclude that this malware was a fearsome beast with nothing else like it
in the world.”81 Cybersecurity reporter Kim Zetter describes the attack in her
groundbreaking investigation Countdown to Zero Day, which not only walks through the
complexities of the malware in question, but also lays out a strong case for who was
behind the attack amid one of the most perennially challenging issues in cybersecurity:
attribution.
As no one has yet taken responsibility for Stuxnet, the public has had to rely on
technical and investigative reporting to understand what happened, who did it, and why.
It is now generally believed that the covert Operation Olympic Games began in 2006
under U.S. President George W. Bush. This was in response to reports that the Iranian
government was planning to resume uranium enrichment at its facility in Natanz. What
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allegedly ensued was a top-secret multi-year campaign orchestrated by United States and
Israeli intelligence services to infiltrate Iranian networks at Natanz and hijack automation
systems to damage centrifuges used in the enrichment process. Over the course of many
months, Stuxnet caused intermittent changes in the rotational velocity of the centrifuges
until they broke. Because of certain nuances built into the malware to obscure its
presence and actions, Iranian scientists grew increasingly confused about otherwise
inexplicable operations, purportedly leading to internal turmoil and further disruption.82
There is a broad range of opinion on the effectiveness of Stuxnet, given the
implied goal of degrading Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium. Stuxnet reportedly
damaged about 980 centrifuges (at the time, one-fifth of the total) at the facility in
Natanz.83 A widely promoted estimation puts the amount of time that Iran’s nuclear
program was set back at two years; others put the time closer to a few months.8485 In what
may be the best indicator of the operation’s long-term effectiveness, a 2011 report by the
IAEA states, “[the] rate of production of 3.5% enriched uranium at Natanz has dipped
slightly, but continues to be among the fastest rates documented; [it] remains almost
twice as fast as pre-Stuxnet (2009-2010).”86
David Sanger was one of the first journalists to tell the story of Stuxnet and
although the world hasn’t seen anything like it since it did its damage in Iran, Sanger
chronicled recent attempts by the U.S. to cause physical damage by cyber means in a
series of 2017 articles, culminating in his 2018 book The Perfect Weapon. Mr. Sanger
details evidence that the United States government has shown interest in a “left of
launch” strategy for stopping missile testing by the North Korean regime, including a
detailed plan that was presented by Raytheon at the 2015 Space and Missile Defense
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Symposium. The plan in question goes so far as to promise cyber means of “sabotaging
[missiles] on the factory floor.”87 According to Sanger, “the idea is to strike an enemy
missile before liftoff or during the first seconds of flight.”88 However, no definitive link
has been made between the “left of launch” initiative and North Korea’s failed missile
tests.
There is another story worth mentioning if only to put to rest claims that using
software to effect physical destruction long predates Stuxnet. Several prominent books
engaging in purported histories of cyber war include references to what may have been
the 1982 explosion of the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk gas pipeline near Tobolsk,
USSR. The story originally appeared in former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas
Reed’s 2004 memoir At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War. In it, Reed tells
a second-hand story from Gus Weiss, a National Security Council member under
President Ronald Reagan. As the story goes, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
infected computer chips with a “trojan horse” computer program designed to cause
automation systems to malfunction. The malicious software “worked,” supposedly
causing pressure to build up in a portion of the pipeline, resulting in an explosion
estimated to have been on the order of three kilotons. For reference, that force would
have been equivalent to the 1917 Halifax Explosion in Canada, which leveled the entire
village of Richmond, killing 2,000, or nearly a fifth of the explosive power of the atomic
bomb “Little Boy,” which in 1945 the United States detonated over Hiroshima, Japan,
killing as many as 150,000.89
The story was met with outright denial by former Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti (KGB) head of the Tyumen region Vasily Pchelintsev.90 Not to be confined
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to Russian sources, Zetter allows for the story’s “apocryphal” status. Thomas Rid lays out
a convincing criticism of the alleged plot in Cyber War Will Not Take Place. In 15 years,
Reed’s tale has yet to be corroborated by any officials or people familiar with the matter
(Rid notes this to be especially damning for the story’s veracity given declassification of
supposedly related documents such as the Farewell Dossier, which described Western
espionage on Soviet technology). Reed himself, in a 2010 interview with Zetter, left open
the possibility that he was misremembering the situation, acknowledging “I don’t know if
it really happened.”91 Now, that’s non-repudiation. Such widespread detraction has not
stopped others from retelling the story as a matter of fact. Notably, Richard Clarke
mentions the incident in passing as a matter of fact in his book Cyber War, with no
sourcing whatsoever.92 Thomas Aquinas offers a charitable interpretation of the
motivations behind this kind of storytelling: “Because philosophy arises from awe, a
philosopher is bound in his way to be a lover of myths and poetic fables.”93
The truth is that imagination has both established and thus far ruled the cyber
arena insofar as it may be considered a new domain of warfare. In many ways, cyber war
appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, foretold since the days of dial-up and consistently
reinforced over the years with increasingly urgent promises of devastation:
preconceivedly infamous cyber Pearl Harbors and cyber 9/11s; matters of “when, not if”
from the very leaders of agencies purportedly developing, unleashing, and at times losing
track of antecedent and enabling mechanisms for those kinds of attacks. It was Admiral
Michael Rogers, then director of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the
National Security Agency (NSA) who stated in March of 2016, “it is only a matter of
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when, not if, you are going to see a nation-state, group, or actor engage in destructive
behavior against critical infrastructure in the United States.”94
Five months after that speech, a group called the Shadow Brokers began releasing
a virtual arsenal of exploits linked to the Equation Group and associated Tailored Access
Operations (TAO) unit at the NSA. It turned out that the NSA had been developing and
stockpiling 0-day vulnerabilities and corresponding exploits, most notably the
EternalBlue exploit, which led to a serious of global cyber events. In May of 2017,
WannaCry ransomware spread to computers around the world by way of EternalBlue.
The cryptoworm disproportionately affected England’s National Health Service, locking
systems and forcing the diversion of some patients from certain hospitals. The same
exploit was used in the 2017 NotPetya ransomware, which brought several global
businesses, most notably shipping company Maersk, to a standstill. If those warning the
general public about the dangers of cyber-physical events are the same individuals
leading organizations where code capable of causing them is developed and lost, then
imagination is guaranteed to become reality. Who or what, then, can truly mitigate the
risk of these types of situations?

Enter the Governors of Cyber War
The Tallinn Manual
On May 14, 2008, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. The decision for its location was no
coincidence. Beginning April 27, 2007, Estonia experienced a series of disruptive cyber
events (commonly, if colloquially, “attacks”) consisting mainly of coordinated distributed
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denial of service (DDoS) campaigns against popular email and banking websites. The
campaigns persisted over the course of 22 days and resulted in “temporary degradation or
loss of service on many commercial and government servers.”95 Many then (as now)
suspected Russian involvement as a form of retaliation for Estonia’s moving of a Sovietera monument to a less public place. In 2008, CCD COE founder Dr. Rain Ottis
published an analysis of the events concluding that “the event can be explained as a
Russian information operation against Estonia.”96 Though, he was careful to add, “It
should be noted that this analysis does not prove that there was an information operation
due to lack of evidence from the Russian authorities.”97 Another testament to the
challenge of attribution; in this case arousing suspicion by negation.
Months after the establishment of the CCD COE, the Centre contacted Michael N.
Schmitt to request he speak at a conference. In his own words, Schmitt denied the
invitation because, “at the time, lots of folks were focusing on cyber, but no one had
answers.”98 He offered that if the Centre would put together a project to start answering
the many questions that were out there, he would be willing to participate. It took only a
few more months for the CCD COE to once again contact Schmitt, offering him “carte
blanche” to start answering questions about cyber warfare.99 Soon thereafter, as director,
Schmitt brought together the first International Group of experts to start a conversation
around if, how, and when international law applies to issues of cyber warfare.100
Schmitt had been thinking and writing about cyber warfare long before Stuxnet
was even a consideration. In 1999, he wrote an article entitled Computer Network Attack
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework. It was
one of the earliest expositions on the implications that jus in bello would ostensibly have
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on violent force delivered via the internet. In that paper, he lists as hypotheticals the
derailment of trains and pirating of municipal traffic controls, among other scenarios. His
initial assessment was that computer network attack is “war on the cheap” where barriers
to entry are low and rewards are high. His conclusions began the mapping process of
cyber events to implications within international law, specifically Chapter VII of the UN
Charter (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression). The same year that he published Computer Network Attack, Schmitt led a
Naval War College Symposium to broaden the discussion (published in 2002 as
Computer Network Attack and International Law in the Naval War College Journal of
International Law Studies. Six years later, Schmitt would go on to become project
director for the group that in 2013 and again in 2017 produced the Tallinn Manual
(versions 1.0 and 2.0, respectively), a comprehensive, non-binding treatise on
international law as it applies to cyber warfare (version 1.0) and other cyber operations
(added in version 2.0).
It is important to note that the two versions of the manual are not merely the
product of updating information. Rather, the first edition maintains a narrow focus on
international law as it pertains to warfare (acts of aggression) and cyber analogs thereof,
while the latter broadens the scope to include more general operations in cyberspace that
do not necessarily reach the threshold of being considered acts of war. Boasting more
than 100 military and legal expert participants and reviewers, the Tallinn Manual remains
the most compendious effort to date to map, codify, and influence international legal
norms related to jus ad bellum and jus in bello in cyberspace. Though it is worth noting
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that even in Tallinn 2.0, published a decade after the attacks on Estonia, Schmitt notes the
lack of relevant treaties as well as “sparse” public availability of opinio juris.101
From the outset of developing the first Tallinn Manual and continuing through
development of 2.0, Schmitt clearly identified the bounds of the problems at hand.
Though the subject matter differs between versions, the principal question has aimed at
reconciling existing international law with actions undertaken by nation-states in
cyberspace. As Schmitt noted during the release event for 2.0, the process for discussing
and attempting to reach consensus on these various topics has changed over time. The
first Tallinn Manual relied on fewer than 50 individuals to make up the group consisting
of the IGE, along with supporting legal researchers, and editors. Nearly all of these
individuals represented either the United States or countries in Europe.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 more than doubled the size of the IGE and its supporting
roles, and on top of refining its peer review process, instituted the so-called Hague
Process. This was the result of the Dutch government approaching the IGE, asking how
they could support the advancement of the group’s initial findings. The addition of the
Hague Process was a response to increased attention from nation-states who, after largely
sitting the sidelines for 1.0, showed much greater interest in being part of the process for
2.0. The Asser Institute described the process thusly: ‘The Hague Process’ consists of
over fifty States that attend at least one, sometimes more, of the three International
Group of Experts meetings. In these meetings, States are provided with the draft texts and
given the opportunity to express their views and comments on the content, an input which
Prof. Schmitt described as extraordinarily useful.102 Or as Schmitt tells it:
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“Nation-states originally kept us at arm’s length because we were going
to seize the normative landscape from them. The second round, nationstates came to them to ask how they could help. IGE committed to the
principle that states and only states make international law. IGE listened
to state legal advisor but reserved the right to tell states if their views were
nonsense.”103
On February 8, 2017, the Atlantic Council hosted the launch of Tallinn Manual
2.0. After a brief overview of how the manual came into being, Schmitt made a few brief
remarks before stating with hints of relief and nostalgia, “we’re finished.”

The Digital Geneva Convention
On a cyberdust covered content management platform tucked deep within the
domain substructure of Microsoft Corporation lies a document that may be the first
published reference to the technology giant’s call for a digital (or electronic) Geneva
Convention. Written by Corporate Vice President Scott Charney (now vice president,
security policy), Rethinking the Cyber Threat is a 14-page memo that outlines threats in
four main categories: cyber crime [sic], military espionage, economic espionage, and
cyber warfare. Commenting on the asymmetric advantages of cyberspace, Charney
makes the claim that, “the internet permits a potentially anonymous and untraceable
individual with virtually no resources to engage a nation-state in cyber warfare.”104 He
goes on to invoke the idea of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” and theorizes that “perhaps
part of the response is an electronic “Geneva Convention.” Charney ends his paper with a
stepwise approach to governing cyber warfare:
To address cyber warfare issues, countries must first develop domestic
positions on what the rules for this new domain should be, taking due care
to recognize the shared and integrated nature of the domain. Then there
must be an international dialogue designed to create international norms
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for cyber space behavior. Creating these norms will be as difficult as it
sounds, but it is still both necessary and, ultimately, unavoidable. Absent
such an agreement, unilateral and potentially unprincipled actions will
lead to consequences that will be unacceptable and regrettable.105
Like so many arks in so many crates, the subject of an electronic Geneva
Convention was seemingly relegated to its own proverbial Hangar 51, though Microsoft
would show renewed interest five years later. In November 2014, Charney published a
follow-up entitled Governments and APTs: The Need for Norms (Rethinking the Cyber
Threat #2). This document strays from the subject of warfare, mentioning it only five
times in a 15-page document and focusing instead on matters of espionage; a hot topic
given Edward Snowden’s revelations the year prior. Charney puts up the scaffolding for
the DGC, calling for a “new framework,” presumably elucidated in the conclusory four
stepwise points, viz.:106
1. Countries with espionage programs must admit they target other governments
2. Governments must discuss espionage programs that target private sector
3. Governments must agree that the doctrine of proportionality applies to attacks on
civilian products, services, and infrastructures
4. Governments must accept that while private sector companies can be helpful,
they cannot take sides in governmental disputes

By December 2014, things were really heating up towards a codification of what
would become the Digital Geneva Convention. A team of 10 at Microsoft published the
24-page International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing conflict in an Internet-dependent
world. The introduction asserts that, “Cyber conflict and cyber war are not just theoretical
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but are actual possibilities that need to be considered and addressed,” before
acknowledging how nation-states are “operationalizing” cyberspace as a “domain for
conflict.”107 The report presents the chart in Figure 4 as an explanation of various points
at which an escalation in force by nation-states necessitates a particular kind of legal
framework.108 The report pays only glancing notice to Stuxnet, which by then had been
widely documented.

In addition to pointing to LOAC as the ultimate legal arbiter of cyber warfare,
International Cybersecurity Norms put forth the truest DGC prototype to date in the form
of six mandates for nation-states:109
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1. States should not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities (backdoors) or
take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust in products and
services.
2. States should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and
service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors
rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them.
3. States should exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and should ensure
that any which are developed are limited, precise, and not reusable.
4. States should commit to nonproliferation activities related to cyber weapons.
5. States should limit their engagement in cyber offensive operations to avoid
creating a mass event.
6. States should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and
recover from events in cyberspace.

Microsoft’s penultimate policy paper in the evolution of the Digital Geneva
Convention came in June 2016. Charney, leading a team of seven other Microsoft
employees published Articulation to Implementation: Enabling progress on cybersecurity
norms. Following the trend of previous publications, the topic of cyber warfare received
almost no direct coverage. In fact, the only mention of the term warfare is in the only
time any of Microsoft’s DGC-related blogs mentions the Tallinn Manual. The great irony
is that the citation in question pulls from the Tallinn Manual to point to six governmental
proposals that are “currently driving the global dialogue on cybersecurity norms.”110
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Suffice it to say that the Digital Geneva Convention was not quite the ex nihilo
product it may have seemed in 2017.

On February 14, 2017, one week after the launch of Tallinn Manual 2.0,
Microsoft President Brad Smith took to the mainstage at RSA Conference in San
Francisco to deliver the conference’s keynote speech. Standing in front of a giant digital
screen emblazoned with the Microsoft logo, he walked through indicators of growing
threats to cyber security. He cited the fact that 74% of the world’s businesses were
expecting to be “hacked” over the coming year; that total economic losses to cybercrime
would reach $3 trillion by 2020; that, “We've seen cyberattacks move from enthusiasts to
financial thieves to now governments around the world.”111
Smith further declared that, “cyberspace is the new battlefield,” echoing the
sentiments of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III, who spoke about the topic
seven years earlier at the same conference. It was Lynn who at the time said, “The
government cannot protect our nation alone...It is going to take a public-private
partnership to secure our networks." Where Lynn’s focus was on defense of national
infrastructure, Smith presented his idea as a “call on the world's governments to come
together.” In the spirit of the successful 1949 framework designed to protect civilians
during times of war, Smith proposed a new “Digital” Geneva Convention to “protect
civilians on the internet in times of peace.”
Smith laid out the details of the DGC as he saw it, stating, “the time has come to
call on the world’s governments to come together, affirm international cybersecurity
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norms that have emerged in recent years, adopt new and binding rules, and get to work
implementing them.” The six “new and binding” rules he presented were:
1. No targeting of tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure;
2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from
events;
3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than to stockpile, sell, or exploit them;
4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and ensure that any developed are
limited, precise, and not reusable;
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to cyberweapons; and
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass event

The following section applies the information gathered for each of the
aforementioned models to the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, then
offers an evaluation based on Ostrom’s evaluative criteria.
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ANALYSIS
Define the policy analysis objective and specify the analytic approach
The primary policy analysis objective for both the Tallinn Manual and the Digital
Geneva Convention is to determine current and potential effectiveness of achieving selfstated and otherwise implicit goals. A secondary analysis objective is to determine the
likelihood of each model to prevent harm from befalling noncombatants in the event of
cyber warfare. The analytic approach for both models and each objective is to define and
map key model elements to Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development
framework, following Polski and Ostrom’s guidance for applying the IAD to policy
analysis and design.
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The Tallinn Manual
IAD Elements
Exogenous Variables
Biophysical/Material
Conditions

Mapping Model to Framework
The Tallinn Manual 2.0

Attributes of Community

Rules

Cyber-Physical Attacks as
Common Pool Resource
People: Lawyers, policy scholars, noncombatants
Nation-states: Legal advisors, military strategists
Corporations: Legal counsel, fiduciary responsibility
Customary International Law
The Law of Armed Conflict
UN Charter
Geneva Conventions
Case Law (opinion juris)
Findings of the UN GGE
The Schmitt Process
The Hague Process
The Tallinn Manual 1.0

Action Arena
Action Situations

Participants

Interactions

Outcomes

Cyberspace as a battlefield
e.g. Stuxnet (if nation-state)
e.g. Cyberattacks on ICS
People: Nation-state duty to
protect noncombatants
Nation-states: Must adhere to international law
Corporations: No hack back
Nation-states determining strategy and policy
Nation-states consulting international law
Adoption of the Tallinn Manual
Nation-states consulting the Tallinn Manual
Nation-states engaging in cyber warfare
Nation-states impacting civilian infrastructure
The IGE
The Tallinn Manual 2.0
The Hague Process for legal issues in cyberspace
International law applies in cyberspace
International influence by participation
No nation-state attacks resulting in civilian harm
(PHEPH)
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Physical and material conditions
The Tallinn Manual recognizes the potential for nation-states to utilize cyber
means to conduct warfare. This is explicitly defined as the use of cyber operations to
inflict injury upon individuals or cause physical destruction in another state. The Tallinn
Manual’s emphasis on nation-state responsibility initially points to material conditions at
the public property level only. However, destruction must be viewed as a pollutive act,
potentially leading to permanent loss, as in death. Whether analyzing the situation as a
function of security, warfare, physical well-being, or utility garnered from public
infrastructure, this results in a necessarily highly subtractive environment in which it is
difficult to exclude participants (i.e. nation-states on the attack).

Analyze community attributes
The genesis of the Tallinn Manual can be traced to 2009, when the NATO CCD
COE agreed to sponsor the undertaking at the suggestion of Michael Schmitt. Schmitt
then assembled the IGE based presumably on existing relationships, recommendations,
and research based on scholarly contributions to date. The community, therefore,
involves some degree of international institutionalism and civilian expertise, eventually
incorporating broader individual expertise and nation-state input from top lawyers from
more than 50 countries. The interactions between parties were organized around three
sessions and an ongoing drafting and peer review process. Dialogue and pursuit of
opinion from around the world captured one of the most vital aspects of sustainable
common pool resource management: communication. It is worth noting that the IGE did
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not include professionals from the cybersecurity industry (i.e. private sector). It is not
entirely clear if that was intentional or, if so, why that was the case.
Only a small subset of the community under analysis is likely to be immediately
impacted by the Tallinn Manual, viz. government legal advisors. Three years on from the
release of the final version, the vast majority of references to the manual are in law
journals and legal blogs. In order to become an effective institution, the Tallinn Manual
will require advocates to ensure widespread adoption and opine periodically, in an
official capacity, on real-world issues to which rules defined in the manual apply. The
Tallinn Manual 2.0 analysis rests on the understanding that international law applies to
cyber operations. This means that actions in cyberspace do not take place in a legal
vacuum and states both have rights and bear obligations under international law.
Considering Figure 3, government lawyers will necessarily be responsible for
educating and guiding political and military leaders on how international law applies to
planned interstate action. Those leaders in turn must be willing to accept the findings of
the Tallinn Manual or develop a system by which unresolved issues and concepts may be
discussed. The Dutch government provided a method of bringing states together through
what came to be known as the Hague Process. The community is decidedly public sector,
(i.e. nation-states), with the possible addition of academics in general.

Analyze rules
There are two sets of rules requiring analysis. The first set is in the development
of the Tallinn Manual itself. The rules that governed establishment of the IGE,
communication between members, the peer review process (collectively, the Schmitt
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Process), and eventually the Hague Process proved successful in achieving consensus on
many applications of international law. This set of rules and processes (the institution of
the manual compared to the manual as an institution) proved successful and scalable as
many of the processes for 1.0 were transferred and improved upon for 2.0. The success of
1.0 in gaining the attention and desired participation of nation-states is another key
indicator of its success. In that specific case, it demonstrates the IGE’s ability to garner
deference, thereby achieving some measure of authority, reinforcing its governance
capacity.
The second set of rules includes those published in the manual itself. Specific to
the topic of international humanitarian law, Chapter 16 on The Law of Armed Conflict
Generally (Rules 80-85), but the manual is virtually exhaustive in its coverage of
international law topics. Constant care (Rule 114), protection of journalists (Rule 139),
protection of children (Rule 138). protection of cultural property (Rule 142). The Tallinn
Manual cites case law, legal conventions, international treaties, the Geneva Conventions,
ICRC opinions, the UN charter, all in addition to providing commentary and differing
viewpoints of the IGE.
The Tallinn Manual can become a true institution if it can be shown that its
assertions are being accepted by nation-states. This association will grow stronger as
those same nation-states find themselves in states of war. For now, the manual is the most
thorough legal analysis on the subject of cyber warfare and both its rigorous process and
book format have the greatest potential to become global rules in use.
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Analyze patterns of interaction
The question remains how much influence the manual will have on nation-state
decisions in the conduct of cyber warfare. Though, this analysis adjudges the Tallinn
Manual to have a high potential effect on the actions of nation-states. This is because of
the authority it garners by association with established and customary international law.
Furthermore, its endogenous expert authority and ties to an international defense alliance
in NATO all lend to strong governance potential. However, the same association could be
more of a hindrance than a help if Russia views it as adversarial. Schmitt makes clear
throughout the manual’s introduction that it is an independent work, but if Russia views it
as an outgrowth of NATO attempts to balance regional power, then it could spell
difficulty for true global adoption.

Analyze outcomes
The Tallinn Manual’s book format makes it a portable and recognizable reference
tool for state lawyers. During the launch event, Michael Schmitt claimed that Tallinn
Manual 1.0 “probably sits in every [ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of defense]
legal advisor’s office in the entire world, from Washington to Beijing.” If that is the case,
then the same would reasonably be expected of Tallinn Manual 2.0. In fact, the Hague
Process likely guarantees even broader nation-state adoption. After three years, the
manual remains a relevant subject for legal research and analysis. Google Scholar shows
1,120 references to the manual since 2019 alone. One of the central tenets of successful
commons governance is the importance of communication. The fact that scholars around
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the world continue to discuss the Tallinn Manual bodes well for its long-term acceptance
and adherence, at least among legal scholars.
A true evaluation of the strength of the Tallinn Manual in guiding states can only
take place if and when a nation conducts a cyberattack. Because of how interwoven the
Tallinn Manual is with existing international law, the violation thereof would be a serious
indictment about the preventive capabilities of law. The study is over. The book is
written. As Schmitt noted at the same launch event, “We don’t make law, but
[disagreeing is] going to be a tough sell for other states.”

Evaluation
The Tallinn Manual achieves its stated aim of becoming a resource for state legal
advisors in order for nation-state leaders to better understand how actions in cyberspace
may be constrained by international law. The greatest question now relates to the degree
to which international law itself prevents war. If international law in fact prevents warfare
in any capacity, then the Tallinn Manual will be a successful model of governance for
what may be termed notional or supra-arenas. The de facto nature of human reliance on
law as promoter or dissuader of one action or another elevates the efficacy of the Tallinn
Manual as a tool in the prevention of cyber warfare; certainly those most egregious
violations of established international humanitarian law.
There do not appear to be any plans to continue to update the manual or hold
additional meetings of the IGE. That leaves the door open for other institutions and
organizations, including nation-states, to take the lead. The nation that sees Tallinn
Manual 2.0 as a baton and takes it has the opportunity to control the conversation about
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what constitutes legal and illegal action in cyberspace, especially during the prosecution
of cyber warfare. Without an established governance regime to maintain the manual and
continue to steward the conversation, there is some danger that what may currently be
seen as a rulebook could morph into a playbook for nefarious state actors.

Evaluation Table for the Tallinn Manual 2.0
Evaluative Criteria
Efficiency in use of
resources, especially
capture of economies of
scale
Equity in distributional
outcomes and processes
Legitimacy as seen by
participants in decision
processes
Accountability, especially
to direct users of resource
Fiscal equivalence: the
extent to which the
beneficiaries of a public
good or service are expected
to contribute towards its
production
Consistency with the moral
values prevalent in that
community
Robustness or resiliency

Tallinn Manual Rating (Low, Medium, High)
High – Adherence to customary international law
bakes in existing attempts to preserve many types of
resources, including security and physical
infrastructure as CPRs
High – In theory, international law applies to all
nations equally; institutional attempt to include
scholars from around the world for input and
presumably greater distribution of message
High – The Tallinn Manual rests on established
international law and the Schmitt and Hague
Processes ensured broad discussion and review of
proposed rules; Implicit NATO association
Medium – Makes case for compliance with law but
reliant on existing enforcement mechanisms;
compellence, deterrence, etc.
NA – No calls for additional action aside from
consideration by state legal advisors

High – Comports with customary international law
and took into account the many views of an
international group of experts as well as >50 nationstates
Medium – The Tallinn Manual is only as robust as
international law. It lacks the support structure
necessary to carry on the conversation as a constant
governor
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The Digital Geneva Convention
Mapping Model to Framework
IAD Elements
The Digital Geneva Convention
Exogenous Variables
Biophysical/Material
Cyber-Physical Attacks as
Conditions
Common Pool Resource
People: Policy scholars, Noncombatants
Attributes of Community
Nation-states: Political and military leaders
Corporations: Executives, employees
1. No targeting of tech companies, private
sector, or critical infrastructure;
2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain,
respond to, and recover from events;
3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than
to stockpile, sell, or exploit them;
Rules
4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber
weapons and ensure that any developed are
limited, precise, and not reusable;
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to
cyberweapons; and
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass
event
Action Situations
The Action Arena
Cyberspace as a battlefield
Participants
Tech sector (defense), Nation-states (offense)
Interactions
Public-private partnership
• Positive press reception
• Friction with CCD COE
• Cybersecurity Tech Accord
Outcomes
• CyberPeace Institute
• No binding international treaties
• No nation-state attacks resulting in civilian
harm (PHEPH)
Analyze physical and material conditions
Literature and speeches concerning the proposed Digital Geneva Convention
recognize the potential for nation-states to utilize cyber means to conduct warfare. This is
implicitly understood as the use of cyber operations to inflict injury upon individuals or
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to cause physical destruction in another state. The Digital Geneva Convention’s emphasis
on a combination of nation-state and corporate responsibility blurs the line between
public and private property. However, destruction must be viewed as a pollutive act,
potentially leading to permanent loss, as in death. Whether analyzing the situation as a
function of security, warfare, physical well-being, or utility garnered from public
infrastructure, this results in a necessarily highly subtractive environment in which it is
difficult to exclude participants

Analyze community attributes
The Digital Geneva Convention began with a policy paper by Scott Charney,
writing in his capacity as a vice president at Microsoft. Charney eventually assembled a
small team of other Microsoft employees who continued to expound upon his ideas with
their own. These small groups of about 10 employees periodically updated the policy
papers and eventually the ideas became the Digital Geneva Convention, which Microsoft
President Brad Smith presented to an audience of private sector technology firms at RSA
Conference. Smith shared a similar presentation to the United Nations in Geneva,
Switzerland. The majority of the affected community is the private sector; however, the
aim of the DGC is to impact nation-states by brokering a binding international agreement.
Thus far, there is little to support the idea that the DGC has had any impact at the nationstate level, much less has it formed any basis for a binding agreement.
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Analyze rules
The Digital Geneva Convention consists of six rules. Since Brad Smith’s
announcement in 2017, the rules have remained in their original state and may be
reviewed on Microsoft’s On the Issues blog. As presented, the rules appear to put forth
novel concepts with no reference to existing customs, laws, norms, or best practices. All
six of the rules are intended for adherence by nation-states and Smith has stated on
multiple occasions his goal of achieving an international binding treaty to solidify their
institutionalization. Because they are limited in number, this analysis comments on each:

1. No targeting of tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure
It is telling that the first item on the list is that nation-states should not target tech
companies. The prime directive of international humanitarian law, upon which the
Geneva Conventions are built, is the preservation of the lives of noncombatants.
Nevertheless, rule one of the Digital Geneva Convention seems to be covered by
international law concerning attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, not to
mention the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons.
Though, critical definitions are missing from Microsoft’s proposed rule that would
strengthen its legitimacy: 1. “targeting” and 2. bounds of a “tech company” and the
“private sector.” Without these definitions, no further analysis can take place and the rule
is determined to have low likely efficacy.
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2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from
events
Here again, the ambiguity of the term “events” makes it impossible to analyze the
intent of the rule. If the intent is that nation-states assist when private sector companies
are the victims of cyberattacks (as defined in this paper), then that may fall within a
certain duty of care. However, the threshold of compellence is not clear. The MITRE
ATT&CK framework provides a popular visual representation of how cyberattacks can
take place. It would be beneficial to map trigger points to some such framework.
Otherwise, likely adoption of this rule and overall anticipated efficacy is low.

3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than to stockpile, sell, or exploit
them
This rule has some novelty in the era of cyber warfare and deserves additional
input from the international legal community. The NSA leak and resulting nefarious use
of the EternalBlue exploit demonstrates the dangers of harboring vulnerabilities and the
means to exploit them. Nevertheless, this would place a new duty on nation-states and
again the threshold for compellence is unclear. If nation-states are expected to report
vulnerabilities to vendors, that implies that it is within their purview to seek out
vulnerabilities in the first place. This may be a reasonable action as part of a risk
management and supply chain vetting strategy, but it is unclear when and why nationstates would conduct code analysis to the degree that they are finding software
vulnerabilities. Likely adoption for this rule is moderate.
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4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and ensure that any
developed are limited, precise, and not reusable
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to cyberweapons
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass event
The final three rules require greater disambiguation prior to analysis. It is not
clear how the restraint in developing cyber weapons does not satisfy the commitment to
nonproliferation and how that in turn does not satisfy limiting offensive operations. If a
nation-state satisfies rule four, then it follows that they would satisfy rules five and six.
Regardless, the same problem threads the entire needle. That is, that without clear
definitions and bounds, these rules have low overall likelihood of adoption and are
therefore ineffective. Ironically, the similarity of the three rules does bode well for
broader adoption if a nation-state agrees to any one of them.

Integrate the analysis
The Digital Geneva Convention was conceived behind closed doors by a publicly
traded, private sector technology company. In fact, it was precisely one individual who
decided to write a paper and who summarily decided to update the same paper years later,
leading to development of the DGC. While various Microsoft employees shared the
vision along the way, there is no indication that any major international, interdisciplinary,
or even intercorporate effort took place to fully assess even the need for a Digital Geneva
Convention. Most baffling is that there are many recommendations for effective
development of governance mechanisms in the literature. As Avant and Martha
Finnemore point out almost presciently:
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“because of its role in the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions, for
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has a unique role
to play in the development of international humanitarian law (Finnemore
1996). NGOs attempting to develop a new understanding of the
humanitarian effects of particular weapons, for example, are most likely to
succeed if they first secure the endorsement of the ICRC Secretariat and
persuade its representatives to speak out publicly on behalf of the issue.112
If Microsoft has attracted the interest of the ICRC, then the two organizations are doing
well to hide any endorsement. A search for the phrase “Digital Geneva Convention” on
the ICRC website finds only two results, neither of which indicates any kind of
partnership.
Furthermore, by the time Microsoft launched the DGC, the Tallinn Manual 1.0
had been in publication for four years, yet Smith makes no mention of the manual in
either San Francisco or Geneva. In fact, as of July 2020, the only reference to the word
Tallinn on the Microsoft Blog is in a late 2017 piece by Brad Smith, a rather bad faith
criticism stating, “While the Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE made important progress in some
areas, they could not reach consensus on what the U.N. Charter has to say about losses
of functionality in civilian infrastructure even when nothing gets physically broken.” The
emphasis on the U.N. Charter strawmans the argument, avoiding the entirety of the
Tallinn Manual’s work in mapping any and all relevant international law to matters in
cyberspace. For the record, Rule 26 on Necessity is a good read.
The lack of attention paid to governance scholarship and existing international
law, including, of all things, the Geneva Conventions, is baffling. A reasonable
conclusion is that a large corporation saw an opportunity to seize on the brand
recognition of a well-established international agreement and graft on a few quasi-novel,
at times self-serving, rules, then present them without any external input or debate. If the
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aim of the DGC is to establish a governance regime based on binding international
agreements in order to protect civilians from the machinations of cyber warfare, then the
initial effort leaves plenty to be desired.

Analyze outcomes
The Digital Geneva Convention was initially well received. The UN Refugee
Agency (UNHCR) published an article opining on what the DGC would mean for the
future of humanitarian action.113 The World Economic Forum bolstered support with a
blog entitled ‘Why We Urgently Need a Digital Geneva Convention. And several
technology trade publications, including WIRED magazine published extollations.114
Since then, Microsoft has sponsored several initiatives to promote the DGC,
including the 2018 launch of a “Cybersecurity Tech Accord” (referred to aptly
confusingly as a Digital Geneva Accord by the New York Times). As of July 2020, the
Accord has nearly 150 tech company signatories. Those signatories agree to uphold four
principles, including the protection of “our” users and customers everywhere, opposition
of cyberattacks on “innocent” citizens and enterprises, empowerment of users to
strengthen protection, and partnering with one another to strengthen cybersecurity. In
June 2020, Accord signatory Facebook was alleged to have helped the FBI develop a 0day exploit for software not owned by Facebook in order to catch a child predator.115
Facebook having reported the suspect to the FBI, determined that it could do more to help
and hired a third-party firm to find a vulnerability in the operating system Tails (which
none of the involved parties own). According to Facebook, the ends justified the means,
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but the report highlights some of the very challenges that the DGC seeks to control, while
amplifying its silence.
In September 2019, Microsoft announced the establishment of the CyberPeace
Institute, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, asserting that, “The internet is the
creation of the private sector, which is primarily responsible for its operation, evolution
and security.”116 Microsoft has alluded to the need for an organization similar to the
IAEA for monitoring cyber weapons. This appears to be one of the main functions of the
CyberPeace Institute, which is currently in the process of hiring forensic investigators
and data scientists, among other positions. It is most assuredly not merely a think tank,
but a potential regulator and governor in its own right. While Brad Smith is a board
member, the organization appears to aim at a more diverse approach than the Microsoft
process that led to the DGC, boasting the likes of former President of Interpol Khoo Boon
Hui and governance scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter. It is worth noting that Michael N.
Schmitt sits on the advisory board for the CyberPeace Institute, which may indicate the
potential to reconcile the models now under review.
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Evaluation Table for the Digital Geneva Convention
Evaluative Criteria
Efficiency in use of
resources, especially capture
of economies of scale
Equity in distributional
outcomes and processes

Legitimacy as seen by
participants in decision
processes
Accountability, especially to
direct users of resource
Fiscal equivalence: the
extent to which the
beneficiaries of a public
good or service are expected
to contribute towards its
production
Consistency with the moral
values prevalent in that
community
Robustness or resiliency

DGC Rating (Low, Medium, High)
Medium – Financial backing of major technology
firm, but lacking structure to effectively scale.
Process too exclusive and rules are overly broad.
Low – The initiative is led by a U.S.-based,
publicly-traded firm. Rule #1 shows the emphasis
for desired outcomes. No clear enforcement
strategy or clear desire to adhere to international
law.
Low – No indication that nation-states are seeking
to adhere to or advance the DGC. Microsoft has not
achieved a binding agreement (a goal of the DGC).
Low – No clear indication of how nation-states will
be held accountable.
Medium – Corporations to take responsibility but
calls for increased government support.

Medium – The aims are generally in line with
existing humanitarian precepts, but there remain
questions about corporate stewardship.
Medium – CyberPeace Institute has opportunity
establish authority in international community. This
could resuscitate a DGC-like model.
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CONCLUSION
Understanding how governance systems work is a vital undertaking. The use of
economic frameworks — in this case, the IAD — can help bound problems unique to
social situations that are otherwise too highly variable to analyze. This research makes
some progress in the application of the IAD to global governance systems, but far more
local research is needed to disconfirm any conclusions presented here about the current
state of affairs, much less any future state. Ultimately, this research assesses the Tallinn
Manual to have a high likelihood of success both in longevity as a reference book for
state legal advisors and as a mechanism for at very least momentary consideration prior
to conduct reaching the level of cyber warfare (though, this paper is much more
optimistic that the international community will heed the IGE’s exercise and more readily
recognize the international legal implications of cyber actions). Conversely, this research
finds that the Digital Geneva Convention has low likelihood of success even if its
longevity is propped up by a multibillion-dollar corporation. The lack of transparent
process in its development, lack of clarity in the rules proposed, lack of open dialog and
debate, and lack of formalization as either treaty or singular reference document,
compounded by general eschewance of governance best practices all support this
conclusion. Those supports stand on top of assertions made by those directly involved in
the development of the Tallinn Manual; generally, that the DGC is a redundant work.117
However, there is some optimism to be found in the related CyberPeace Institute, still in
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its infancy. If the board of the CyberPeace Institute can maintain neutrality and begin a
process similar to those utilized in the development of the Tallinn Manual, it could
breathe new life into a DGC-like governance model.
In closing, I want to draw attention to the interactions exemplified in the attributes
of community diagram found in Figure 3 and associated relative distribution of power.
The Tallinn Manual only ever sets out to speak to a narrow set of individuals within
government and perhaps within the militaries of nation-states, viz. legal advisors. It does
so from a place of explicit independence, claiming to represent no state in particular
(though, it is difficult to shake the NATO associations and paucity of representation from
certain “adversarial” nations). This is clearly delineated at the beginning of the manual
and it stays true to its impartiality and narrow objectives. Microsoft, on the other hand,
used the Digital Geneva Convention to call on nation-states and potentially private sector
companies to agree to a variety of rules and ethical guidelines. By calling its project the
Digital Geneva Convention it necessarily imparts a sense of care for noncombatants as
well. Success of the DGC would potentiate a shift of power to the lower right corner such
that nation-states would be expected to do the bidding of a single, private, American
corporation in the name of preserving human life. While corporate social responsibility
has gained traction in recent years and the stakeholder model has in some ways eclipsed
the traditional shareholder model, this calls for much greater philosophical debate as to
the appropriateness of private industry as a global governor.
One specific question is whether Microsoft or any private industry company can
be trusted to supplement its fiduciary responsibility with a global responsibility for the
preservation of humanitarian values. Two years after announcing the Digital Geneva
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Convention, WIRED reported that since 2009, Microsoft has been helping China censor
information found via Microsoft’s search engine Bing as well as its professional
networking platform, LinkedIn.118 Governance scholar Dan Drezner cites an even longer
time horizon for another American tech giant:
“In January 2006 Google agreed to create a China-based search engine
that complied with the government’s censorship policy. Google’s
acquiescence epitomizes the eagerness of multinational corporations to
comply with Beijing’s demands in order to access the Chinese
marketplace.”119
A common refrain from corporate attorneys is often to effect of, “we merely abide
by the laws of the countries in which we operate.” If that is the case when it comes to
suppression of freedom of speech, what guarantee can companies like Microsoft and
Google offer that they are responsible guardians of human rights, and that those rights
supersede the monetary incentives of market access? These problems approach the
philosophical, but there are more local problems related to the notion of private industry
playing a role in global governance and policymaking.
In fact, Charney addressed some of these issues head on in his 2014 piece, citing
the difficulty of drawing “red lines” in complex environments. He posits that, “it is
arguable whether [technology] companies better promote freedoms by withdrawing from
challenging markets or by spreading communications technologies.”120 This is a
formalization of the legal philosophy that one can’t make an omelet without breaking a
few eggs. But Charney goes on to note that, “abandoning economic opportunities too
quickly may be a breach of fiduciary responsibility.”121 This is a difficult point with
which to argue, but Charney presumes that fiduciary responsibility is a generalized
normative good. It makes sense that corporations must adhere to their fiduciary
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responsibility, but therein lies the precise reason why it may not be to the greatest good
that those same corporations invite themselves into governing those activities which deal
directly with threats to human life. The moral ambiguity is palpable. Charney offers that
there are “clearly” situations in which moral questions should come before commercial
interests, citing controversy related to IBM’s involvement in the Holocaust, though
history is doing a lot of work for Charney’s surety.
Richard Clarke spends several pages in his 2010 book Cyber War cataloging
Microsoft’s troubling strategy and behavior within the United States government.
Excerpts provided here:122
•

P. 139 “…Microsoft the corporation has an agenda that is very clear: don’t

regulate security in the software industry, don’t let the Pentagon stop using our
software no matter how many security flaws it has, and don’t say anything about
software production overseas or deals with China.
•

P. 139 “…Microsoft is an incredibly successful empire built on the premise of

market dominance with low-quality goods.”
•

P. 141 “Microsoft gave me the very clear impression that if the U.S. government

promoted Linux, Microsoft would stop cooperating with the U.S. government.”
•

P. 143 Microsoft can buy a lot of spokesmen and lobbyists for a fraction of the

cost of creating more secure systems.”
In fairness, these statements are both anecdotal and allegedly took place over a decade
ago. Nevertheless, as those familiar with brand management can attest, perception can
outweigh reality; especially when it comes to security. That is not to say that Microsoft is
disqualified or irredeemable. Still, the problem of competing interests remains and
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perhaps more troubling than concerns over fundamental flaws in software are those
market influences that transcend the kinds of individuated rational action (in the formal
sense) exhibited both in the development of the DGC and in Clarke’s recounts.
Corporate influence in political decision making is hardly a new concept. The
practice of lobbying is well established, and it is no secret that corporations have a vested
interest in actively developing legislation that will support their business strategies.
Though, special caution must be taken when business and legislation comingle on the
battlefield. Again, this is a problem as old as Smedley Butler, yet it remains without a
good solution. To exclude corporations from public conversation would be to ignore the
massive impact and influence they have on technological development and public
adoption. Cybersecurity poses the added question of responsibility for security. Herein
lies the importance of calling up a perspective capable of dealing with complex economic
situations. By viewing concepts like security and warfare as resources unto themselves
and endeavoring to identify categories not otherwise descriptive of the kinds of publicprivate relationships that exist today, analysts can more accurately describe and predict
for actions more or less likely to meet societal objectives, viz. peace.

Closing thoughts and next steps
A few thoughts for those endeavoring to apply the IAD for their own assessment
of social systems. First is that the IAD is a framework for application, meaning that
successful employment depends largely on the existence of an active action arena with
discrete situations that can be observed, measured, and governed at a local level. That is
not to say that there is no use for the IAD in understanding and governing global issues
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such as cyber warfare (an activity whose arena remains empty). On the contrary, this
research should provide some basis for future analysis in the event that a true cyberattack
does take place at the nation-state level.
Second is that polycentricity opens wide the aperture of recursion. For instance,
NIE theorizes that institutions are in fact the rules-in-use governing a particular arena.
They may be formalized as laws, or they may arise as informal norms. Yet, it is often
organizations, themselves governed by institutions, that develop those rules-in-use. As
Ostrom shows, interactions that take place within arenas feed back into systems, opening
the potential for externalities (from changes to exogenous rules in the interim) to affect
evaluated outcomes. The key is to freeze a system in time rather than wrestling with
time-continuous analysis, though discovery of how to reconcile the time factor would
probably garner another Nobel for NIE. Those interested in the problem of cyberwarfare
might be willing to analyze Stuxnet as a situation with a well-populated arena.
Another major foundational element of NIE is that certain aspects of
neoclassicalism can be used to understand modern social problems dealing with rules
governing behavior in particular arenas. The emphasis, however, is on the institutions
themselves as opposed to rational actors. What I’ve found in this research is that even the
most critical functions imaginable (matters of life and death) often come down to rational
actor decision making. This research would benefit from careful integration of some of
the principles elucidated by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision,
esp. regarding the Rational Actor Model. To be done effectively, this would require an
profiling key actors involved to better understand their preferences and beliefs regarding
risk and utility. An interesting challenge for some enterprising scholar.
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